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COMMENTS
SUBSTANTIVE USE OF EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS
OF WITNESSES UNDER THE PROPOSED FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE
With the publication last March of the preliminary draft of the rules of
evidence for the lower federal courts.' the possibility of implementa-
tion of reforms in the law of evidence on a national level is opened
for the first time.2 Although all aspects of the proposed rules will
doubtless stimulate discussion, the committee's treatment of the hear-
say rule is likely to provoke the most comment.
I. THE HEARSAY RULE AND APPROACHES TO REFORM
The hearsay rule, long a storm center of evidence reform, today
accounts for approximately one-third of all evidence problems in the
courts.3 Developed as case law in England between 1675 and 1690,
the rule was analytically structured in its present dimensions by Wig-
more in his comprehensive Treatise on Evidence in 1904. Wigmore
discerned a general rule excluding all statements made outside the court-
room as proof of the matter stated. This rule was qualified by admitting
statements falling within class exceptions based on the necessity for,
and trustworthiness of, the evidence.
At the time a brilliant synthesis of existing case law, the long-term
effect of Wigmore's treatment has been to rigidify the hearsay rule.
Statements falling within a class exception have been admitted without
regard to their probative force; statements of high probative force
have been automatically excluded. Reform has been achieved by squeez-
ing new situations into old exceptions or by legislative creation of
1 COMMITTFE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF
THE UNITED STATES. PRELIMINARY DRAFT OF PROPOSED RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR THE UNITED
STATES DISTRICT COURTS AND MAGISTRATES (1969) [hereinafter cited as CoMMITrEE ON
RULES OF PRACTICE].
2 The implementation of the American Law Institute's Model Code of Evidence
and the Uniform Rules of Evidence of the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws has been determined by state legislative action, and few states
have approved them. See, e.g., UTAH, SUPREME COURT, COMMI= ON UNIFORM RULES
OF EVIDENCE, FINAL DRAFT OF THE RULES OF EVIDENCE (1959).
3 See Note, Erosion of the Hearsay Rule, 3 U. RICH. L. REv. 89, 92 (1968).
4 5 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1362 (3d ed. 1940) [hereinafter cited as WiozaoRE].
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new class exceptions. 5 The contemporary rule emerges as "an old-
fashioned crazy quilt made of patches cut from a group of paintings
by cubists, futurists and surrealists." '
Critics of the hearsay rule have not generally denied, however, the
basic premise that such evidence is, as a rule, of less probative value
than testimony given in open court. This judgment is founded upon
the necessity of considering evidence as part of the adversary system,.
with its emphasis on cross-examination. Wigmore described cross-exami-'
nation as
beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the dis-
covery of truth . . . the great and permanent contribution of the
Anglo-American system of law to improve methods of trial pro-
cedure.7
He based the hearsay rule almost exclusively on the lack of opportunity
for cross-examination. Morgan has stated that
the principle ground for rejecting hearsay is an idea basic to our,
entire system of litigation: the adversary has a right that the trier shall
not be influenced by testimony which the adversary has had no op-
portunity to cross-examine.8
Other scholars have mentioned additional factors which may decrease
the trustworthiness of hearsay: the fact that the declarant was not under
oath at the time the statement was made, the absence of demeanor evi-
dence, and sometimes the diminished reliability of the human memory
in dealing with spoken words as opposed to physical events. Acknowl-
edging that these factors decrease the weight of hearsay, evidence com-
mentators have nevertheless been disturbed by the exclusion of any evi-
dence which has some incremental value. Jeremy Bentham took a
strong position:
5 See Note, supra note 3, at 124; Weinstein, Probative Force of Hearsay, 46 Iow" L.
REv. 331, 342 (1960).
0 Morgan and Maguire, Looking Backward and Forward at Evidence, 50 HAUv. L.
REv. 909, 921 (1937).
75 WiGmoE § 1367, at 29.
8 Morgan, The Hearsay Rule, 12 WAsH. L. REv. 1, 4 (1937).
O C. McCormcic, EVmENcE § 223 at 455, 456 (1954) [hereinafter cited as Mc-
CORMIcK]; Morgan, Hearsay Dangers and the Application of the Hearsay Concept,
62 HItmv. L. REv. 177, 182 (1948); Strahorn, A Reconsideration of the Hearsay Rule
and Admissions, 85 U. PA. L. REv. 484 (1937); Maguire, The Hearsay System: Around
and Through the Thicket, 14 VAND. L. Rav. 741, 747 (1961).
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.. . the danger of "misdecision" for want of the information con-
tained in the extrajudicial statement is "preponderant over the danger
of misdecision by reason of information rendered deceptitious for
want of such explanation as, had the party been forthcoming, it
might have received." 10
Various solutions to this dilemma have been suggested by scholars."
Few would support blanket exclusion or unrestrained admissions of all
hearsay statements;' 2 controversy centers on the method of defining ex-
ceptions. United States District Judge Jack B. Weinstein has listed five
proposed alternative solutions:
(1) Admission of all hearsay with discretion in the trial judge to ex-
clude statements 'whose probative value is outweighed by such dangers
as surprise, deliberate creation of evidence, or undue extension of the
trial. In addition to exercise of judicial discretion, dangers are minimized
to some extent by requiring notice before trial of intention to use a
hearsay statement, different treatment of evidence created for the pur-
poses of the trial, exclusion of cumulative evidence and inference of
spoliation. 3 Despite these safeguards, this rule is apparently unacceptable
to the trial bar because it entails extensive judicial discretion.' 4
(2) Liberalization and codification of the existing rules. This is the
approach taken by the Model Code and Uniform Rules. While described
as the most accepted method and the modern trend, it retains the rigid
character of the system of class exceptions and thus may sometimes ex-
clude evidence of high probative value and include some with little.15
(3) Judicial nullification through appellate refusal to reverse 'when
hearsay has been admitted. Weinstein suggests that the federal courts
are presently following this course.' This alternative seems most open
10 Chadbourn, Bentham and the Hearsay Rule-A Benthamic View of Rule 63 (4) (c)
of the Uniform Rules of Evidence, 75 HARv. L. REv. 932, 939 (1962).
"Weinstein, Alternatives to the Present Hearsay Rules, 44 F.R.D. 375 (1968).
12 Moreover, an arbitrary rule of exclusion would not entirely avoid the problems
in rulings on the admissibility of extrajudicial statements, since hearsay cannot be
defined without reference to the general fact situations and evidentiary use of the
statements. The admission, for instance, of extrajudicial statements for purposes of
impeachment or as proof that the statements were made may involve subtle distinctions
and attempts to squeeze hearsay statements into non-hearsay classifications.
iaWeinstein, supra note 11, at 378. See also UNIFORm RULE OF EVDENcE 45 and
proposed FEDERAL RULE 4-03.
14 See Fillman, Inadmissible Hearsay as Evidence to Impeach a Witness Other than
the Decarant, 57 NEv. U. L. Rav. 499, 507 (1962).
15 Weinstein, supra note 11, at 378.
16 Id. at 386-87.
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to criticism because it effectively gives the trial court unlimited dis.
cretion, based not on articulated standards such as those of proposed
rule 4-03, but on personal feelings regarding the hearsay rule.
(4) Selective application. This is not actually a separate solution but
works in combination with other approaches, applying different stan-
dards to hearsay use in jury and non-jury, and criminal and civil trials.,,
(5) Restatement of the present exceptions to the hearsay rule in gen-
eral ter=s, excepting any statement which has a substantial guarantee of
trustworthiness and cannot be duplicated satisfactorily in another form.-'
The present class exceptions would not be discarded but rather included
as examples of statements falling within the general exception. This ap-
proach, in effect, accepts the analysis underlying the Wigmore synthesis
but cuts away the artificial engraftment of subsequent case law. It recog-
nizes that the dangers in admitting hearsay can be largely avoided by
limiting admission to cases falling within the analytical basis of the old
exceptions? This is the position accepted by the proposed federal rules.2 0
As the drafters pointed out,
The design of this rule and of the rule which follows is calculated
to take full advantage of the accumulated wisdom and experience of
the past. The common law exceptions are resorted to, however, not
as a basis for formulating an extensive series of minute categories into
some one of which a proffered hearsay statement must be fitted un-
der a penalty of exclusion, but rather as furnishing examples of ap-
propriate application of one or the other of the two rules. Thus
counsel may prepare for trial with ample predictability of result,
while at the same time room is left for growth and development of
the law of evidence in the hearsay area consistently with the broad
purposes expressed in Rule 1-02.21
But despite the clear intention not to limit admissibility to hearsay
within the old class exceptions, their retention as examples will probably
exercise a conservative influence on the courts. Judicial excursions out-
7 ld. at 380.
18 Id. at 379.
19 See Ladd, The Relationship of the Principles of Exclusionary Rules of Evidence
to the Problem of Proof, 18 MiNm. L. Ray. 506, 507 (1934), making this point with
respect to the jury's treatment of existing testimony.
12 0 COMMITTEE ON RuLEs OF PRATCE, supra note 1. The rules generally admit state-
ments when the circumstances under which they were made offer assurances of
accuracy.
21 Id. at 179.
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side the mapped area of admissibility are likely to be cautious. It should
also be noted that the rules are stated permissively in terms of non-
application of the hearsay rule rather than positive admissibility, thus
allowing other grounds of exclusion.2 These factors will necessarily
limit judicial development of the rule. And yet the rules will still be
subject to criticism insofar as judicial discretion is increased and, thus,
trial preparation made less certain.2 3
Despite the drawbacks inherent in any compromise, however, the
proposed rules seem to represent an optimum balancing of the conflict-
ing problems. Not only do they permit evidence of high probative
value to come in but, theoretically at least, they exclude evidence of
little value presently admissible under class exceptions.
II. EXTRAJUDICIAL STATEMENTS OF WITNESSES
The admissibility of extrajudicial statements of witnesses testifying
at the trial has been among the sharpest thorns in the hearsay thicket.
Controversy has centered on the substantive use of statements admitted
for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. Though these state-
ments are excluded in nearly all jurisdictions, scholars almost unani-
mously agree that they should be admitted.24
A. Admissibility of Extrajudicial Statements Under the Proposed
Federal Rules
Proposed rule 8-03 (b) (5) retains the traditional hearsay exception,
past recollection recorded. Proposed rule 8-01 (c) (2) excludes the fol-
lowing from the traditional definition of hearsay:
PRIOR STATEMENT BY WITNESS. The declarant testifies at
the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning
the statement, and the statement is (i) inconsistent with his testimony,
or (ii) consistent with his testimony and is offered to rebut an express
or implied charge against him of recent fabrication or improper in-
fluence or motive, or (iii) one of identification of a person made
soon after perceiving him, or (iv) a transcript of testimony given
under oath at a trial or hearing or before a grand jury . ..5
221d. at 178.
23 Weinstein, supra note 11, at 380.
24 See, e.g., United States v. Rainwater, 283 F.2d 386, 388 (8th Cir. 1960); Ellis v.
United States, 138 F.2d 612, 617 (8th Cir. 1943); State v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 361,
285 N.W. 898, 900 (1939); 3 WiGmoRE §§ 1018, at 1132.
2 5CoMMmIr ON RuLEs OF PRAcncr, supra note 1, at 159.
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This rule represents a deviation from the general approach of the
proposed rules. From the viewpoint of the traditional definition of
hearsay, it has, in effect, created a new class exception to the tradi-:
tional rule by means of definition.2 6 This apparent inconsistency can:
be justified on a number of grounds.
1. Prior Consistent and Inconsistent Statements - With respect to
prior consistent and inconsistent statements, the approach of the pro-
posed rules is supported by Wigmore's and Maguire's anlalyses of the
rule. Such evidence is not hearsay because the declarant is present and
subject to cross-examination.
[A]n extrajudicial statement is rejected because it was made out
of court by an absent person not subject to cross-examination ...
Here, however, by hypothesis the witness is present and subject to.
cross-examination. There is ample opportunity to test him as to the
basis for his former statement. The whole purpose of the Hearsay
[sic] rule has been already satisfied. Hence there is nothing to prevent,
the tribunal from giving such testimonial credit to the extrajudicial
statement as it may seem to deserve. Psychologically of course, the,
one statement is as useful to consider as the other; and everyday ex-
perience outside of court-rooms is in accord.27
Two objections have been made to this analysis. First, for those schol-
ars who include the danger of faulty reproduction in the definition of
hearsay, these statements fall at least within the fringes of the rule.
Thus, both McCormick and Strahorn would distinguish situations in
which the witness declarant was unable to remember or denied making
the statement. 28 Strahorn would admit prior consistent statements only
in certain situations where the error of reproduction was low (such
as prior identification of the accused or complaint of rape), and prior
inconsistent statements only when admitted by the declarant.2
His position with respect to prior consistent statements seems to be
based on an imprecise definition of this category as an exception to the
hearsay rule; he apparently would include statements previously made
by the witness but not repeated at the trial. The statements which con-
cern him are now admissible under other exceptions to the hearsay
• 26See Ui moaas RuL OF EViDENcE 63 (1) and MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503
(1942), which create a class exception for all extrajudicial statements of witnesses.
273 WIGMORE § 1018, at 687-88. See also Maguire, supra note 9, at 768.
28 McCoRMicK §§ 39, 224; Strahorn, supra note 9, at 498.
2 9 Strahorn, supra note 9, at 498.
1969]
UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 4:110
rule. Thus, while prior identification is a prior consistent statement, it
is admitted in some jurisdictions when the witness can no longer identify
the accused under an exception to the hearsay rule based on the pro-
bative weight of a contemporaneous identification.30
If the definition of prior consistent statements is properly limited to
those repeated at the trial, there seems to be no reason to limit admis-
sion to cases where the error of reproduction is small. Since the evi-
dence is being used as proof of the matter rather than the words stated,
the only concern is that the substance of the statement be correct.
But by definition the substance is confirmed by the declarant's testi-
mony at the trial. Requirement of precise reproduction of his words
is irrelevant.
This is not true, however, of prior inconsistent statements. Here
Strahorn's reservations are shared by McCormick, who would exclude
statements unless proved to have been written or signed by the declarant
or unless he admitted having made them.31 The danger of faulty repro-
duction becomes relevant since the declarant has not confirmed the
substance of the statement. Under this theory of the hearsay rule,
some prior inconsistent statement cannot be excluded from the defini-
tion of hearsay.
In addition, judicial critics of the Wigmore view have emphasized the
importance of the presence of the conditioning devices of cross-exami-
nation, the oath and the sanction of prosecution for perjury at the
time the statement was made.32 This position is taken in a much quoted
opinion by Judge Stone.
The rule is well settled that the only office of impeaching testimony
of this kind is to negative or neutralize the testimony to which it is
directed.... The oath of the witness solemnizes his former extrajudicial
statement not at all. It goes only to his testimony which is occasion
for and target of the impeachment. The previous statement was when
made and remains an ex parte affair, given without oath and test of
cross examination. Important also is the fact that, however much it
may have mangled the truth, there was assurance of freedom from
prosecution for perjury.
SO See text p. 123 infra.
3 1 McCoRmicK § 39, at 82. As McCormick points out, his position is taken by the
English Evidence Act of 1938 which admitted previous ritten statements of wit-
nesses. The new 1968 act, however, admits oral statements as well, moving from the
McCormick to the Wigmore position. Civil Evidence Act of 1968, § 3, ch. 64.
32 See cases cited note 24 supra.
The chief merit of cross examination is not that at some future
time it gives the party opponent right to dissect adverse testimony:
Its principal virtue is in its immediate application of the testing proc-
ess. Its strokes fall while the iron is hot. False testimony is apt td
harden and become unyielding to the blows of truth in proportion
as the witness has opportunity for reconsideration and influence by
the suggestions of others, whose interest may be, and often is, to main-
tain falsehood rather than truth . 3
For courts accepting this view, prior statements fall within the hearsay
rule defined in terms of hearsay dangers.
Thus, while most prior inconsistent and consistent statements are out-
side the definition of hearsay employed by all scholars, a certain few
fall within that used by a minority of writers and by most courts.
Exclusion on the basis of these criteria alone, however, seems ex-
cessively academic and, in fact, inconsistent with a practical definition
of hearsay, which implies consideration of the weight of the evidence.
This consideration can be best determined by balancing the extent of
the existing dangers against the intrinsic trustworthiness of the evi-
dence and the safeguards available in its evaluation. Applying a realistic
test, the approach of the proposed rules can be defended even with
respect to substantive use of many prior statements forgotten or de;
nied by the declarant because their accuracy can be adequately ex-
amined.
Assuming arguendo, however, the correctness of Judge Stone's
suggestion that the impact of the conditioning devices is greater when
immediate, it would seem to be outweighed by other considerations,
at least when the rule is limited, as are the proposed rules, to state-
ments already admitted into evidence 33a The substance of the prior
consistent statements will be given under- oath and subject to immediate
cros-examination. The declarant's demeanor will be subject to evalua-
tion. If additional weight is given the contents of these statements, it
is due to the fact of repetition, not to the substance of the statement.
This is the traditionally accepted basis for admission of prior consistent
statements.
Thus, Judge Stone's evaluation is only relevant in the case of a prior
inconsistent statement. But in this case the initial fact of contradictioi
in itself will lower the weight of the evidence in the estimation of the
3 Siate v. Saporen, 205 Minn. 358, 362, 285 N.W. 898, 900, 901 (1939).
83a See text p. 124 infra.
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.Jury. For all practical purposes the statement will already be impeached
when it is introduced. In fact, cross-examination may be more effective
than in the usual situation, where opposing counsel can fail because
he has no indication of possible weaknesses in the testimony.
The same considerations concerning efficacy of cross-examination
and presence of other conditioning devices would apply to McCormick's
position with respect to prior inconsistent statements denied or claimed
to be forgotten by the witness when he has testified to the substance
of the events concerned on direct. A line of federal cases, starting with
Learned Hand's decision in Di Carlo v. United States,34 supports the
view that the jury is able to evaluate prior inconsistent statements which
the defendant has refused to admit. In Di Carlo, Hand pointed out that
[i]f, from all that the jury see of the witness, they conclude that what
he says now is not the truth, but what he said before, they are none
the less deciding from what they see and hear of that person and in
court. There is no mythical necessity that the case must be decided
only in accordance with the truth of words uttered under oath in
court. 5
Thirty-five years later in United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp.,
reaffirmed the position taken in Di Carlo:
• . . [Liogically at any rate there is at times no reason to deny their
competency. It is one thing to put in a statement of a person not
before the jury: that is indeed hearsay bare and unredeemed. But it
is quite a different matter to use them when the witness is before
the jury, as part of the evidence derived from him of what is the
truth, for it may be highly probative to observe and mark the manner
of his denial, which is as much a part of his conduct on the stand as
the words he utters. Again and again in all 'sorts of situations, we
become satisfied, even without earlier contradiction, not only that a
denial is false, but that the truth is the opposite. . . This is not to
rely upon the statement as a ground of inference taken apart from
346 F.2d 364 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 268 U.S. 706 (1925). See also United States
v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 984
(1957) (Hand's opinion); United States v. Block, 88 F.2d 618, 620 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 301 U. S. 690 (1937) (Hand's opinion). Federal cases following this line are
Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 19 (D.C. Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019
(1954); United States ex rel. Ng Kee Wong v. Corsi, 65 F.2d 564 (2d Cir. 1933).
This position has been accepted in Alaska. Hobbs v. State, 359 P.2d 956, 966 (Alaska
1961).
35 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
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the sum of all that appears in court; it is to allow the jury to use
the whole congeries of all that they see and hear to tell where the
truth lies . . . [O]ut of the whole nexus of his conduct before the
jury, they may treat those words alone as affimatively relevant.36
More difficult is the case where the witness denies not only making
the statement, but all knowledge of the event described. In this situa-
tion there is no adequate opportunity for cross-examination,-r although
the jury is at least able to evaluate the witness' demeanor. 8 Moreover,
as critics of Uniform Rule 63(1) and Model Code rule 503 have
pointed out, prior inconsistent statements may be the only evidence
on one side of the case. When this is true, substantive use of the
statements will determine whether the case goes to the jury. 9 This
problem, not troublesome when there is adequate opportunity for cross-
examination, becomes more so when there is none. The problem will
probably not arise, however, under the proposed federal rules because
the federal courts apparently follow the majority rule limiting the ad-
mission of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment of the actual
testimony of the witness in court.4 °
In summary, the exclusion under the proposed federal rules of prior
consistent and inconsistent statements (as defined in the federal courts)
from the definition of hearsay is well supported under the draftmen's
theory of exclusion; analytically they do not fall within the definition.
The proposed rules can also be supported under the general terms
of proposed rules 8-03 and 8-04, which except from the hearsay rule
statements made under circumstances which offer assurances of ac-
curacy. Some proponents of the use of prior statements of witnesses
have stressed the fact that the accuracy of statements concerning an
event is likely to decrease with lapse of time." Not only does memory
3 United States v. Allied Stevedoring Corp., 241 F.2d 925, 933 (2d Cir. 1957).
37 Falknor, The Hearsay Rule and Its Exceptions, 2 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 43 (1954);
31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1100, 1105 (1956).
88 MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 503 at 234 (1942).
aoFalknor, supra note 37, at 55; Wright, Uniform Rules and Hearsay, 26 U. CQw.
L. REV. 575 (1957); 14 Okla. L. REv. 72, 74 (1961); 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1i01, 1105
(1956).4 0 See text p. 122 infra. See also 3 WIGMoRE § 1043 and cases therein cited. Westing-
house Electric Corp. v. Wray Equipment Corp., 286 F.2d 491, 493 (Ist Cir.), cert.
denied, 366 U.S. 929 (1961); The restriction is not explicidy stated in either proposed
rule 6-13 concerning prior statements or proposed rule 8-01, but it is strongly implied
in the discussion following proposed rule 8-01.
4 1 See CozmrmrrrE ON Rum.Es OF PRocEDuRE, supra note 1, at 173, 205; Ladd, Impeach-
menit of One's Own Wimess-Nw Developments, 4 U. Cm. L. REv. 69, 85 (1936);
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often progressively fail, but the intervening period permits time for
such influences as persuasion, bribery, sympathy and guilt to work on
the witness.42
A recent case in Wisconsin, 43 overruling previous law limiting the
use of prior inconsistent statements to impeachment, vividly illustrates
this point. Gelhaar v. State was a prosecution of a wife for the murder
of her husband in the kitchen of their home. The crucial witnesses for
the state were a son and daughter who had been upstairs in the house
at the time of the alleged murder. On the night of the incident the
police took separate statements from both children out of each other's
hearing. These statements were substantially similar; both testified to
hearing the mother threaten the father just before he called to his
daughter for an ambulance. In addition, the daughter claimed to have
heard her father groan and say, "She did it." At the trial the son
denied any memory of these facts and testified that his father had re-
ferred to the accused as a "whore"; the daughter also claimed not to
remember her prior statement, supported her brother's testimony, and
further claimed that she had heard her father threaten to kill her
mother.4 The court, relying heavily upon McCormick, pointed out the
obvious under these facts: prior statements involve less hazards of in-
accuracy due to distorted memory, corruption, false suggestion, intimi-
dation, or appeal to sympathy.4 5
Of course, all cases involving prior statements will not entail facts
suggestive of a motive to falsify at the trial. Even in the usual case, as
Hand indicated in Di Carlo, there is often no reason to assume that
statements made on the stand are more likely to be true than those
made previously out of the courtroom. 46
Under proposed federal rule 8-01 (b) (2) the evidence in Gelbaar
would be admissible. However, if the children had denied any memory
of the event, the evidence would be excluded. There may be particular
reason, however, to admit prior written statements in a case where the
McCormick, Some High Lights of the Uniform Evidence Rules, 33 TExAs L. Rav. 559,
562 (1955).42This is pointed out by the draftsmen. COMMITTEE oN RvuL~s OF PRACTICE, supra
note 1, at 165.
43 Gelhaar v. State, 4 Wis.2d 230, 163 N.W.2d 609 (1969). The court limited its
holding to statements made by a declarant having an opportunity to observe the facts
stated and introduced for purposes of impeachment.
44 163 N.W.2d at 611.
45 Id. at 613.
46 Di Carlo v. United States, 6 F.2d 364, 368 (2d Cir. 1925).
witness claims not to remember the events involved and is unwilling
to verify the truth of his former statement.47 Here the inference of a
subsequent decision not to testify under the influence of intervening
events is strongest. Protection against unfair surprise of the defendant
could be provided by requiring notice and judicial discretion to ex-
clude when circumstances make the evidence untrustworthy or pre-
judicial.4 The trial bar, however, is unlikely to support such a rule. The
compromise expressed in the proposed rule seems more likely to re-
ceive approval at this time.
Apart from theoretical considerations justifying the substantive use
of prior statements, criticisms of the change are blunted by the limited
effect which the proposed rule will have on existing law. The state-
ments are already admissible; they merely may not be used as sub-
stantive evidence. McCormick, among others, has called the rule a
"verbal ritual" which requires juries to make a subtle distinction diffi-
cult even for the judicial mind.49 But, as has already been noted, in
some cases the new rule may determine whether the case gets to the
jury. Since this result will necessarily be limited to the few cases when
a turncoat witness' testimony constitutes the entire case, and because
the opportunity to cross-examine, coupled with the tendency to doubt
the testimony of an impeached witness in the absence of any support-
ing evidence, offer adequate safeguards, this objection seems weak.
A more effective limitation on the impact of the proposed rules is
the exclusion of prior consistent or inconsistent statements not initially
admitted for purposes of impeachment or corroboration. According to
the draftsmen, this limitation is designed to discourage preparation of
prior statements contrived for use at the trial, a prospect which has
alarmed some commentators."
The effect of this approach is to apply the traditional common law
restrictions on admission of prior statements. While the latitude al-
lowed opposing counseling in cross-examination is generally broad, the
federal courts have not allowed impeachment by prior inconsistent
statements unless the witness has testified concerning the substance of
the event described.
47 McCormick, The Turncoat Witness: Previous Statements as Substantive- Evidence,
25 TExAs L. REv. 573 (1947).
4 8 Weinstein, supra note 5, at 338.
49 See McCORMICK § 39, at 77.
Vo See CoMMrrrE oN Ruias oF PRAcTncE, supra note 1, at 164; Dow, KLM v. Tuller:
A New Approach to Admissibility of Prior Statements of a Witness, 41 NEB. L. REv.
598, 607 (1961); Morgan, supra note 9, at 193.
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Admission of prior consistent statements is subject to even further
limitations. Under the common law, admission of prior consistent state-
ments is limited not only to corroboration of an impeached witness,
but also to corroboration only after certain kinds of impeachment. Most
courts admit prior statements after impeachment by suggestion of bias
or motive to fabricate when they were made before the motive or bias
arose. 1  Similarly, such statements are admitted to rebut a suggestion of
recent fabrication.52 But the majority of courts exclude prior consistent
statements after impeachment by prior inconsistent statements on the
theory that the fact of contradiction remains, regardless of how many
times the witness has told one story or the other. 5 3 Wigmore supported
a variation of the minority view, which admitted prior consistent state-
ments when the prior inconsistent statement had been denied as proof
that the latter had never been made.14 In situations where the prior
inconsistent statement had been admitted by the witness, it was ex-
cluded on the basis of irrelevancy (not for lack of probative force);
it did not refute the inference created by the prior inconsistent state-
ment that the declarant was capable of either confusion or prevarica-
tion. 5
The position of the federal courts has varied. The Supreme Court
has refused to admit prior consistent statements made before trial but
after prior inconsistent statements.56 With respect to statements made
before the prior inconsistent statement, some federal courts have ac-
accepted the Wigmore view; others have allowed the trial judge to
exercise discretion.57 But the proposed federal rule takes the more
51 See Boykin v. United States, 11 F.2d 484 (5th Cir. 1926); United States v.
Keller, 145 F. Supp. 692 (D. NJ. 1956); People v. Feld, 305 N.Y. 322, 113 N.E.2d
440,443 (1953); 4 WIGMoRE § 1128.52 This includes such situations as rape when immediate complaint is natural and
plaintiff is allowed to introduce evidence of complaint to rebut the inference of
fabrication which arises from silence. Ellicot v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10 Pet.) 412, 434
(1836); United States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 566 (2d Cir. 1956), rev'd on other
grounds, 353 U.S. 391 (1957).
53 4 WIGMOaa § 1126, at 197; 45 CALiF. L. REv. 202, 205 (1957).
54 4 WIGMORE § 1126, at 198 (Michigan Rule). See Thomas, Rehabilitating the Im-
peacbed Witness with Consistent Statements, 32 Mo. L. Rav. 472 (1967); Stewart v.
People, 23 Mich. 63 (1871).
55 Thomas, supra note 54, at 484. But Hand has pointed out that prior consistent
statements always have some probative force: "EMlost persons would probably con-
sider any earlier consistent account, in some measure at least, confirmatory of a
witness' testimony." United States v. Sherman, 171 F.2d 619, 622 (2d Cir. 1948).
a6Conrad v. Griffey, 53 U.S. (11 How.) 480 (1850); Ellicot v. Pearl, 35 U.S. (10
Pet.) 412 (1839).
57Dagley v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 344 F.2d 245 (7th Cir. 1965); United States
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restrictive majority position. 8 Thus, admission of prior consistent state-
ments will be limited by the form of impeachment utilized by opposing
counsel.
As indicated above, the retention of these common law limitations
on the admissibility of prior consistent statements under the proposed
rule is based primarily on a desire to discourage the use of statements
prepared especially for trial. Had the draftsmen been influenced by
the common law theory, the restriction would probably appear in pro-
posed rule 6-13, where it logically belongs. Their concern seems mis-
placed. Under existing law statements can be prepared and used to re-
fresh the witness' memory either before or during the trial, thus achiev-
ing the same result. 9 Moreover, juries probably react more favorably
to the drama of live testimony than to the reading of a long detailed
statement, thus pressuring attorneys to use this approach. The proposed
rule can be criticized as overly cautious in this respect.
As a whole, however, the draftsmen's decision to admit prior con-
sistent and inconsistent statements for impeachment and corroboration
is a welcome recognition of reality, supported by the opportunity for
evaluating the evidence, and, in many cases, by its probative force.
2. Prior Identification-Proposed rule 8-01(b) 2 (iii) excludes from
the definition of hearsay prior identifications by witnesses testifying at
the trial. In many cases a prior identification is admitted as consistent or
inconsistent with an identification made at the trial, and therefore is
indistinguishable from other statements in these categories. Because
rule 8-01 (c) (2) (iii) is not limited to statements admitted on other
grounds, however, testimony of prior identification by a witness pres-
ent at the trial is admissible even when the declarant denies all memory
of the statement or the event.
This exception 0 to the hearsay rule has been accepted not only by
scholars6 ' but by many courts 2 and by a number of state legislatures 3
v. Leggett, 312 F.2d 566 (4th Cir. 1962); Affronti v. United States, 145 F.2d 3, 8
(8th Cir. 1944).
usSee text p. 115 supra.
59 Morgan, The Relation Between Hearsay and Preserved Memory, 40 HAv. L.
REV. 712 (1927).
6 0 Because the opportunity to cross-examine may be limited under some circum-
stances, some prior identifications fall within the traditional hearsay definition.
6 1 See 4 WiGMom § 1130 (Supp. 1964); Morgan, supra note 59,. at 726; 30 RocKY
MT. L. REV. 332 (1955); 36 TEXAs L. REv. 666 (1958).
2 See United States v. De Sisto, 329 F.2d 929 (2d Cir. 1964); United States v.
Barbati, 284 F. Supp. 409 (ED. N.Y. 1968); Howard v. State, 4: Md.. App.. 74, -241
A.2d 192, 193 (1968); Judy v. State, 218 Md. 168, 146 A.2d 29, 31 (195); .State v.
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on the basis of its probative force and reliability. Justice Traynor
pointed out in People v. Gould64 that
[e]vidence of an extra-judicial identification is admissible . . . because
the earlier identification has greater probative value than an identifica-
tion made in the courtroom after the suggestions of others and the
circumstances of the trial may have intervened to create a fancied
recognition in the witness' mind.65
In these cases the diminished ability to cross-examine is counter-
balanced not only by the higher reliability of the first statement but
also by the absence of the hearsay danger of faulty reproduction,6 as
the fact repeated is simple and is often conveyed by a non-verbal as-
sertion. The witness testifying to the declarant's identification is pres-
ent at the trial and subject to cross-examination concerning his oppor-
tunity to observe the event. Even when the identifying witness de-
nies knowledge of the event, his veracity and general ability to
observe are subject to examination both by opposing counsel and by the
jury. Accompanying the substantial guarantee of trustworthiness is
the necessity for the evidence. Prior identification thus meets the re-
quirements both of Wigmore and of the draftsmen for exceptions to
the hearsay rule.
The only criticism that can be made of the rule is that it is limited
to situations where the declarant is present in court. Presumably, how-
ever, where the probability of accuracy of the statement is high, any
prior identification can come in under the general rule of 8-04. It is
unfortunate that acceptance of prior identification was not encouraged
by including such testimony as an example under this rule.
3. Prior Testimony-Proposed rule 8-01 (c) (2) (iv) excludes from
the hearsay definition the prior testimony of a witness testifying at the
trial. Unlike the other statements excluded from the definition of hear-
say under rule 8-01, prior testimony has generally been treated as an ex-
ception to the hearsay rule.7 The main innovation of the proposed
rule is to relieve prior testimony from the common law restrictions of
privity of issues and parties. 8 (The restrictions, of course, exclude all
Wilson, 38 Wash.2d 593, 231 P.2d 288, 301 (1951).
63N. Y. CoDE oF CriM. P. § 393-b (McKinney 1958); N. J. EviDENcE RUsE 63(1)
(c).
64 54 Cal.2d 621, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 354 P.2d 865 (1960).
65 People v. Gould, 7 Cal. Rptr. 273, 275, 354 P.2d 865, 867 (1960).
66 Morgan, supra note 59, at 726.
675 Wazmoa. § 1370.
6Sld. at §§ 1366-368.
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prior testimony before a grand jury.) The basic reason for these re-
quirements, insurance of the opponent's opportunity to cross-examine,
is met by the declarant's presence at the trial. Although this opportunity
may be diminished (as in the case of prior identification by the de-
clarant's failure of memory), this problem is again offset by the elimina-
tion, in this case complete, of the hearsay danger of reproduction. In
addition, accuracy is increased by the presence of the oath and for-
mality of judicial proceedings on the prior occasion.69 Again, the rule
would be subject to criticism only in its limitation to witnesses testify-
ing at the trial. This is avoided by its inclusion in rule 8-04(b) (1).
4. Past Recollection Recorded-The final category of prior state-
ments of witnesses considered by the draftsmen, past recollection re-
corded, is treated as an exception to the rule rather than an exclusion
from the definition. 6"" This exception admits statements written by the
witnesses or written statements signed by him when the events recorded
were fresh in his memory, but have been since forgotten, and when he
can assert that the statements were true when made.70
The difference in treatment, while probably grounded more on tradi-
tion than theory, is not without logical basis. Statements admitted as
past recollection recorded are distinguishable from the statements cov-
ered by rule 8-01 (b) (2) in that under both the traditional7' and pro-
posed federal rule,72 they are admitted only when the witness fails to
remember the substance of the events recorded. They thus fall within
the hearsay rule because cross-examination is largely ineffective, but
are admitted as exceptions to the rule because of their accuracy. The
danger of faulty reproduction is absent; they were made soon after
the event when memory was fresh; and the witness' demeanor can be
assessed by the jury.
B. Prior Statements Not Explicitly Admissible Under the New Fed-
eral Rules
As the preceding discussion indicates, the only statements not ex-
plicitly admissible under the proposed federal rules are those which the
09 For federal decisions admitting prior testimony, see United States v. Borelli, 336
F.2d 376 (2d Cir. 1964); Tatum v. United States, 249 F.2d 129 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 356 U.S. 943 (1958); Call v. United States, 281 F. Supp. 411 (S. D. N.Y.
1968).
69a Com OMrnra_ oN RuLEs OF PRAcnc , supra note 1, at 174.
70 3 WIGMORE § 734.
7 tId., § 736.
72 CoMrnrrE oN RuLEs OF PRAcricE, supra note 1, at 174.
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witness has forgotten or denied and prior statements not admitted for
impeachment or corroboration- of impeached testimony. While this
writer would favor admission of the latter, many such statements would
probably be excluded under proposed rule 4-03 (b) as merely cumu-
lative. A more interesting question is whether a general exception should
also be made for forgotten or denied unrecorded statements of wit-
nesses present at the trial.
As in the case of prior identification, many of the hearsay dangers
are present in admitting such statements. On the other hand, the gen-
eral ability of the declarant to observe and remember his personal re-
lationship to the parties and his veracity are subject to general exami-
nation at the trial. The accuracy of the statement is enhanced by its
proximity in time to the events. The only factor distinguishing such
statements from forgotten or denied prior identification is the presence
of the hearsay danger of inaccurate reproduction. This distinction
seems based on a general belief that the human memory is less able to
retain recounted events than personal experience. While superficially
acceptable to many people, this thesis has not been addressed by scien-
tific experiment." The inapplicability of the assumption has been noted
by Wigmore74 and apparently accepted by the draftsmen in connection
with prior identification.
Morgan, among others, has suggested the possibility of extending the
theory of past recollection recorded to simple oral statements where
the possibility of error in reproduction is low. 75 On rare occasions such
simple repetitions have been admitted by the courts. 6 Here, of course,
not only is the danger of faulty reproduction reduced, but also there
1 3 Personal communication from Dr. Frederick C. Rockett, psychologist, who ex-
amined the literature from 1955 to the present and discussed the matter with Dr.
H. M. Parsons, President of the Human Factors Society.
74 3 WIGMORE S 744.
75 Morgan, supra note 59, at 727.
76 Shear v. Van Dyke, 10 Hun. 529 (1877). A witness in an action regarding an agree-
ment to gather hay had counted the loads gathered and told the number to plaintiff but
could no longer remember it at the trial. Plaintiff was allowed to testify to the num-
ber. It might be argued, of course, that the number spoken was part of the counting
activity and thus res gestae, but the court did not base its decision on this theory.
Instead it argued that the question did not involve the truth or falsity of the state-
ment. This seems clearly wrong since a false statement of the number would have
been irrelevant to the case. In situations where statements are admitted as proof
only of the words, even false words are relevant. The court went on, moreover, to
analogize the evidence offered to past recollection recorded and seemed to find no
distinction between the two situations. Cf. Jackson, ex dem. v. Thompson, 6 Cow. 178,
179 (1826). There a witness to a will who could no longer see to vertify his signa-
ture was permitted to testify to a prior verification.
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is the added safeguard of the declarant's courtroom verification of the
truth of the statement. It can be argued that these statements should
be admitted on the same basis as prior identification with no require-
ment of courtroom verification. The difficulty with, this position, is in
defining the kind of simple statement which could qualify. Any defini-
tion would necessarily entail a certain amount of judicial discretion.
However, discretion in very similar situations, for .example, in de-
termining whether a statement falls within the res gestae or spon-
taneous declaration exception, has long been accepted. This position
would probably not be acceptable at this time, however. Psychological
research should be conducted with a view to a future liberalization of
the rule in this area.
While the variety of situations possible and the hearsay dangers pres-
ent are such that exclusion of verified oral statements from the hearsay
definition would probably be difficult to support, rule 8-03 (b) (5)
could be augmented to include simple oral statements as exemplary
exceptions to the rule. This would be a modest extension of the tradi&-
tional exception. Theoretically such statements could come in under the
general provisions of rule 8-03, but courts are likely to be more willing
to admit them in the face of an articulated intention by the draftsmen.
III. CONCLUSION
The position taken by the draftsmen with respect to prior state-
ments of witnesses basically adopts the position of Wigmore. It admits
statements where effective cross-examination is assured or, in the case
of prior testimony, where it has already taken place. Thus the new
rules generally exclude forgotten or denied statements unless a minimum
form of cross-examination is possible and the danger of inaccurate re-
production is greatly reduced.
The main criticism that can be made of the draftsmen's position .is
the exclusion of prior statements forgotten but not denied by the wit-
ness. In the case of prior consistent statements, this seems based on an
excessive fear of encouraging statements prepared for trial. In the
case of past recollection spoken, it is based on a more generally ac-
cepted view of human memory. However, even these minor areas can
be corrected through liberal judicial application of the general rules
of exception.
LAURIE R. RocrrTT4 -
7See MCCORMICK § 53.
*Third year student, Columbia Law School. B.A, Barnard, 1964.
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